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Issues and Traditions

In the Timaeus Plato marks out as one of the central
components of his cosmology a god who is unique and rational
and who is described essentially as a craftsman, and indeed
who is typically referred to simply as the Craftsman or Demiurge.
The Demiurge also appears in the Republic VII (530a) and
appears at crucial junctures in all of the late, so-called
'critical' dialogues which expound positive doctrines, that
is, the Sophist (265c-266d), Statesman (269c-273e), and Philebus
(26e-27b, 28d-30e).(1) And yet in discussions of the Platonic
cosmology the question "what does the Demiurge do?" is rarely
raised. There are three reasons for this rarity.
First, there is a very strong tendency in Platonic criticism
to take the figure of the Demiurge non-literally, that is, as
not being intended as an actual component of Plato's cosmological
commitments. There has been a dazzling array of readings of
Plato's cosmology which take Plato as meaning something quite
different than what he says when he describes the Demiurge.
The Demiurge has been taken as a mere doublet of the World-Soul
(Archer-Hind), or for the rational part of it (Cornford), as
a general symbol for any craftsman-like activity (Cherniss),
as only a hypothetical entity serving merely as a literary foil
in the exposition of the human statesman and the World-Soul
(Herter) and as a "sublation" of the World-Soul (Rosen).(2)
These diverse strategies should be seen, I think, largely as
(unneeded) charitable attempts to distance Plato's thought
from Christian thought. If these strategies are correct the
Demiurge is either reduced to some other component of Plato's
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cosmology or is demoted to a mere expository device and so the
question of what he does tends not significantly to arise. The
issue of whether the Demiurge is to be taken seriously as a com
ponent of Plato's cosmology is admittedly complex, but given
the frequency and prominence with which the Demiurge appears in
both mythical (Timaeus, Statesman) and non-mythical settings
(Republic, Sophist, Philebus), his excision from the Platonic
metaphysics through what invariably turn out to be idiosyncratic
hermeneutics seems a desperate measure. I shall speak as though
the Demiurge is meant as a non-reducible component of the Platonic
metaphysics. And insofar as it is possible to give an account
of his workings which both is coherent and gives the Demiurge a
peculiar function in the Platonic cosmology, then arguments for
non-literal readings of the Demiurge are considerably weakened;
for such arguments are either based on alleged contradictions
inherent in literal readings or based on considerations of
cosmological economy.
The question of whether the Demiurge is a serious non
reducible component of the Platonic cosmology overlaps with
the much debated question of whether Plato intended the Demiurge's
act of initially forming the ordered world to be read literally.(3)
Though I am inclined toward a literal reading, my interpretation
of the Demiurge will in fact be neutral on this issue.
A second reason why the question of what the Demiurge does
tends not to arise is that strong and persistent Neo-platonic
strands in Plato criticism have tended to focus interpretive
attention on questions of status rather than on questions of
function. Thus we typically find critical worries over whether
in ontological status or order the Demiurge is superior to or
inferior to the Ideas or on a par with them, and if the last
case, whether the Demiurge is to be identified with the Ideas
in general (or with an aspect of them) or more specifically with
the Idea of the good. Other types of status questions that have
received critical attention deal with the temporal status and
psycho-rational status of the Demiurge (is he timelessly eternal?
sempiternal? or does he possess some other temporal mode? is he
simply equivalent to reason? or something which possesses reason?
is he a soul?). If these are an inquiry's dominant types of
interpretive questions, then again the question of what role
the Demiurge might play in Plato's scheme tends to be down
played.(4)
A third reason for this same result is a general inclination
in the last thirty years of the Anglo-American tradition of
Platonic scholarship to be generally dismissive of cosmological
issues. The reasonableness of this inclination is enhanced if the
Timaeus is taken as a dialogue of the middle rather than late
period. In this case, so it is claimed, the epistemological and
logical concerns which wax so large in the late 'critical' dialogues
can be examined without the incumbrances of the extensive meta-
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physical commitments made in the Timaeus and middle period
dialogues.(5) Further how the metaphysics of the middle
period is construed is almost entirely based on its exposition
in the Republic V(476a ff), of which the Timaeus is taken as
a mere fanciful spin-off. Though I am neutral on the issue
of the dating of the Timaeus, the interpretation of the
Demiurge which I will be advancing will place the interests
of the Timaeus squarely within the epistemological and logical
concerna of the late group, especially the Philebus.
II.

General Interpretation

When the Demiurge is given a positive interpretation,
he is generally taken (implicitly or explicitly) to be an
artist in a narrow sense, that is, as a producer of beauty.
Beauty is construed as a final or intrinsic good, and so
the Demiurge in fashioning the world, as a whole and in all
its detail, is thought to improve upon it by making it
beautiful. The world after his craftings, moldings, and
shapings is better than before in the sense that a world
consisting entirely of Henry Moore sculptures would be
thought to be a better world than one consisting entirely of
dirt clods. The Demiurge's improvements are not (or are not
primarily) meant, on this account, to be functional or to
serve some further end. If they are functional, their function
is simply to provide objects which tend to produce harmless,
pure sensual pleasures. Such pleasures themselves may be
counted as intrinsic, though not very significant, goods
(Republic 584b, Philebus 51b). In this way the Demiurge would
act like a cosmetologist or interior decorator, who takes
over something rough and disheveled and makes it look better.
The Demiurge's standard of taste in this project will be
impeccable, since he has the beauty of the Platonic Forms
as his model (Timaeus 28a6-7). I suggest though that this
in fact is not the nature of the Demiurge's project.
I will be arguing rather that the Demiurge's project is
directed to an epistemological end rather than an aesthetic
one. The Demiurge is bent on improving the world's intelli
gibility rather than its looks. Specifically, I will be
contending that what the Demiurge does is to introduce
standards or measures into the phenomenal realm by imaging
as best he can the nature of Forms where Forms are construed
as standards or measures (section IV).(6) There will, then,
be two levels of standards or measures in the Platonic
metaphysics. On the one hand, there are Ideal standards
and on the other hand, there will be demiurgically produced
standards immanent in the phenomenal realm (section V ) . The
function of the immanent standards is to serve as the
objects of true opinion in much the way that the Ideas serve
as the objects of knowledge (section IV) . The Demiurge's project,
then, I suggest, is to introduce into the world conditions which
make possible the formation of true opinions. And he
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does this by trying to introduce into the world standards
which are derivative upon the Ideal standards. What then
are the properties of the Demiurge's Ideal model which are
relevant to this project?
III.

The Demiurge's Model

Each Form will have two broad classes of properties.
First, each will have properties which distinguish it from
all the other Forms, properties in virtue of which each is
the particular Form it is. Let us call these internal or
proper attributes of a Form. Second, a Form will have
properties simply in virtue of being a Form. It will share
these properties with all the other Forms. Let us call
these properties which Forms have qua Forms external, formal,
or metaphysical properties. Examples of such properties
are: being what really is (Republic 597d, Phaedrus 247c,
Philebus 59d), being the intelligible (Republic 477a, Timaeus
28a, 52a), having some sorts of unity (Republic 476a, Philebus
15a-b, 16d-e), which minimally include being unique (Republic
596a6-b3) and being Ρ-ονοευδές (simple, of one kind?) (Phaedo
78d5, 80b2, 83e2, Symposium 211bl, e4), possessing some
particular sort of self-identity (Phaedo 78e, 80a) and possess
ing some sort of permanence, stability, or eternality (Timaeus
28a, 29b, 52a). What precisely Plato means by assigning each
of these properties to the Forms is a matter of great debate.
If, however, we construe Forms primarily as standards or
paradigms, we can make a broad distinction among these formal
or external properties.
On the one hand. Forms as standards will have among their
formal properties what I will call functional properties.
These are the properties which a Form-Standard has as an
instrument fulfilling a role in Plato's scheme of things.
These properties will primarily be epistemological. Forms
have two epistemological roles. First they in themselves
are in some sense objects of knowledge and second they, as
standards or measures, allow us to identify, by reference to
them, the types and kinds of other things. Thus by reference
to the Standard Meter Stick I can identify other things as
being a meter long. Further, and perhaps derivatively from
this second role. Forms as standards serve as models for the
practical projects (both productive and moral) of rational
agents.
On the other hand. Forms as standards will have among
their formal properties what I shall call standard-establishing
properties. These will be the properties requisite to a
standard's ability to serve as a standard, that is, requisite
to it having the functional properties it has. Most notable
among these properties is some sort of permanence. A standard
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which can change with respect to that in virtue of which
other things are identified by reference to it is not a
(good) standard. Importantly, Plato also seems to interpret
uniqueness as a standard-establishing property of the
Ideas, and gives two arguments to this effect (Republic X,
597c; Timaeus 31a4-7).
IV.

The Demiurge's Use of the Model

If the properties of the Ideas are as I have suggested,
then in creating sensible standards immanent in the phenomenal
realm, standards which image the Ideal standards, the Demiurge
will have to do two sorts of things. First, he will take over
from the phenomenal flux an instance or image of a Form,
an instance which he wishes to make into a standard instance
or paradigm case. He will try the best he can to make this
instance as like as possible in content to the standard of
which it is an instance; that is, he will try to reproduce
as accurately as possible the internal or proper attributes
of the Form. And he does this by eliminating any degree to
which the instance might on its own fall short of its measure.
So immanent standards will be 'perfect' particulars or 'perfect'
instances. By "perfect particular" I mean a particular which
corresponds precisely to the Forrn of which it is an instance.
If I stretch a rubber band from its relaxed length to the
length of the room, then at exactly one point in the stretching
process the rubber band will correspond precisely in length
to The Standard Meter Stick in Paris; at that one point it
is a perfect particular of that standard. At other lengths
the rubber band is a degenerate instance of the standard; it
falls away from the standard as being greater or less than
its measure.(7)
All immanent standards will be perfect particulars, but
not all perfect particulars will serve as standards. For,
second, aside from making the standard case to-be a perfect
particular, the Demiurge will also have to invest it with
certain standard-establishing properties in order to enhance
the prospects of the instance serving adequately as a standard
case. Fixedness or stability is one such property which
improves a particular's aptness to serve as a standard. A
rubber band even though it is stretched to exactly the length
of the Standard Meter Stick will not make a useful stand-in
for The Standard Meter Stick as a measure of length; for it,
on its own, lacks stability and will easily change its length
(as we know by continuing to measure it under different
conditions against The Standard Meter Stick). So too, if the
pound measure in my shop is made of dry ice, it will change
its weight as it sublimes, and so it will serve less well
as a standard than a weight made, say, of iron. We can
always tell of these derivative stand-in standards that they
have changed, by comparing them to the one original standard
for their kind (The Standard Meter, The Standard Pound).
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In reproducing the standard-establishing properties of
the Ideas, the Demiurge's project may be thought of as trying
to introduce some of the Ideality of the Ideas into the
phenomenal realm. But the Demiurge's abilities to perform
this task are highly restricted. What the Demiurge can do is
limited to a large extent by the way the world is given to him.
He is not omnipotent like the ^Christian God. He does not
invent his materials, he discovers them. And in his materials
there is a certain cussedness, which can partially defeat
the enactment of his fully rational creative desires. The
Demiurge can only make the world as like a_s i_s possible to
the Ideal model (tva ώς ομοιότατος αύτψ κατά δύναμιν η,
38b8-cl, cf. 39el).
In some cases, it will be impossible for him to introduce
the same standard-establishing properties which the Ideas
have. Thus, if, as I think is the case, non-corporeality
is one of the standard-establishing properties of the Ideas,
this will be a property which the Demiurge will be unable
to introduce into the phenomenal realm to any degree. In
other cases, while he will not be able to confer upon the
standard cases exactly the same standard-establishing property
which the Ideas have, he will nonetheless be able to provide
a passable substitute. Thus, while the Demiurge cannot provide
standard cases with the sort of permanence which the Ideas
have, nonetheless he can provide them an ersatz permanence
(37d) which serves in a pinch to provide the constancy which
standards require in order to be standards.
I will now defend this general interpretation of what the
Demiurge does. First, I will show that Plato does not
suppose that only Forms can serve in a way as standards, but
he also believes that there are such things as standards
immanent in the phenomenal realm and that these immanent
standards are the product of demiurgic activity (section V ) .
Second, I will show that the Demiurge's intent is indeed
epistemological and will elaborate upon the cognitive role
of the immanent standards (section VI). I shall end by
suggesting that the figure of the Demiurge is more coherent
than usually thought (sections VII and VIII).
V.

Immanent Standards

Textual evidence that Plato did believe that there are
such things as standards immanent in the phenomenal realm
and that he did not suppose that only Forms serve as standards
comes from several diverse sources.
Within the Timaeus itself, the distinction between tran
scendent standards and immanent standards is drawn in the very
opening section of Timaeus' discourse where he is laying out
his principles. Here it is claimed that there are two kinds
of models, standards, or paradigms (παραδείγματα, 28c629a2). One kind is called "eternal," a paraphrastic reference
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to the Ideas. And, in contrast, one kind is called "generated"
( γεγονός )f by which I take Plato, in virtue of the contrast,
to mean nothing more than "is part of the phenomenal world of
becoming."(8) Later in the Timaeus Plato makes it clear that
he intends the Demiurge's making of time to be viewed as a
production of such immanent sensible standards (37c-38e). (9)
This is particularly important for my interpretation. For
the production of time is seen as paradigmatic for all of the
Demiurge's craftings (39e3-4).
When Plato says that the Demiurge makes time, he does not
mean that the Demiurge creates temporal succession. The
Demiurge does not, that is, create events as having a deter
minate, transitive, asymmetrical, irreflexive order. Rather
the Demiurge makes the means of measuring such orderings
against a standard. He makes a clock (or more precisely
clockis) by which we tell time (where 'time' here is taken
colloquially). A clock is a regularly repeating motion with
some marker which makes possible the counting of the repetitions.
Plato initially expresses this understanding of time viewed
as a clock rather abstractly in his claim that time proceeds
or (more precisely) revolves numerably (37d6-7, 38a7-8). Stated
more concretely, in the clocks which the Demiurge makes it
is the bodies of the«planets— the wandering 'stars' --which
are the clocks' markers and it is the planets' circuits which
are the regularly repeating motions. Thus Plato says that
the planets (viewed as moving bodies) come into being to define
(or mark out, διορισμός
) and guard or preserve numbers of
time(38c6). They "define" numbers of time in that they are
the clocks' markers. And the planets "guard" or "preserve"
numbers of time in that each of their continuous wanderings
offers a single referent for numerable motions and thus
guarantee that the numberable motions are indeed repetitions
which are requisite for motions to serve as a clock. When
then Plato says that the planets collectively produce time
(38e4-5) or more simply are time (39dl), he means by time
something technical. He means that time is a clock, a clock
by which we measure that which is measurable about motion
and rest. The time which the Demiurge creates is a standard
or measure immanent
in the phenomenal realm, a standard which
images an Ideal standard (37d5, 7; 38a7; 38b8-cl; 39el-2).
Immanent demiurgically generated standards or paradigms
are also to be found in the Republic. In the central books,
we are told that the ordered parts of the phenomenal realm
("the embroidery of the sky") serve as παραδείγματα
(529d7-8) in the study of the special theoretical sciences
(astronomy in particular). It is clear from the context that
the meaning of the term
παράδειγμα here falls within
the range of its senses which cluster around "exemplar"
rather than around "example" or even "parallel case" which
are both other perfectly common meanings of the term. For
these immanent paradigms are treated like blueprints in nature
and function:
"It is just as if one came upon plans carefully
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drawn and executed by the sculptor Daedalus or some other
craftsman ( δημιουργός
) or artist" (529d8-e3). Plato
in his analogy here is referring to the custom of Greek
sculptors, in making their final products (say, marble
horses), to work from models or paradigms which themselves
are artificial objects (clay horses) rather than to work
directly from models which are natural objects (living horses ) .
(10 )

The paradigms which make up the embroidery of the sky
are explicitly said to be the products of a demiurge (530a6,
cf. 507c6-7), and are explicitly said to be material and
visible ( σώμά τε δχοντα και, όρώμενα
, 530b3) . Some of
these earthly paradigms turn out, as in the case of the
Timaeus, to be the parts of time: "days," "nights," "months,"
"years," and "other stars" (530a7-8), by which designations
it is clear, especially given the context, that Plato is
referring to measures or standards rather than to measure
ments taken from standards.
*
That Plato believed that some perfect instances of Forms
are standards or measures is most clearly and persistently
articulated in the Philebus. In it we find both transcendental
measures (25d3 BT; 66a6-7), and measures immanent in the world
(26a3, 26d9, 66bl-2).(11) The immanent measures of the Philebus
are phenomena which correspond exactly to a Form and which
have had removed from them by demiurgic activity the propensity
to admit of degrees or to be subject to the more and the less.
(For measures as immanent characteristics produced among pheno
mena, which are otherwise subject to the more and the less,
especially see Philebus 24c7-dl.)
VI.

Demiurgic Intent

The introduction by the Demiurge of measures or standards
into the phenomenal realm is extremely important for Plato's
epistemology. For it means that if one has only the phenomenal
realm (and not also the Ideal realm) as the object of one's
cognition, nevertheless, one is not limited to making judgments
based entirely on merely relative comparison or merely relative
measurement. By "merely relative measurement" I mean that
ability which Plato claims we have, usually by direct sensory
inspection and in any case without reference to measures or
standards, to say that, o n æme scale of degrees, one thing
is greater than another, or even possesses the same degree
as another, but which does not entail the further ability to
say what degree on the relevant scale of degrees either thing
possesses. We would have the latter ability only if we could
appeal to a standard or measure (Statesman 283c-285a). When
we are provided with immanent standards, we have the improved
epistemological skill of being able to make precise identi
fications of phenomenal kinds, without having to make
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appeals (at least directly) to anything other than the
phenomena.
As an illustrative example of what Plato means by
merely relative measure and measure against a standard,
let us take Plato's own example of (celestial) clocks.
The Demiurge in creating clocks is not (as mentioned)
creating temporal succession. Temporal succession exists
whether clocks exist or not. Further Plato is not claiming
that in an acosmic world in which there are no clocks we
would (should we exist) be unable to perceive and make
judgments about temporal succession. In a world without
clocks we still can make merely relative measurements of
time, that is, raw judgments of earlier and later, without
appeal to a clock as a standard, just as we can make merely
relative measurements of length, weight, and the like, without
appeals to standards for those dimensions. Thus, if I snapped
the fingers of one hand, paused, and then snapped the fingers
of the other, anyone in the room who was paying attention
could say which of the two events occurred first without
appealing to a clock. But the two events could also be given
a temporal ordering by appealing to a clock as a standard of
measure for dating events. Each snap could be given a date
by reference to a clock, say, 6:31 and 6:32 and given a temporal
ordering as the result of this matching of each event severally
to parts of the clock and then comparing the parts rather than
as a result of comparing the two events directly against each
other. Judgments of past and future are simply judgments of
earlier and later which have as one of their relata the very
act of making the judgment. Such judgments also may be made
either by merely relative assessment or as the result of
assigning determinate dates with the aid of a clock.
In general then, the presence of immanent standards will
allow us to
identify individuals correctly and precisely.
In the case of temporal measures this takes the form of
assigning dates (what time is it? It is 6:01). Derivatively,
immanent measures allow us to make precise comparisons
between things measured; for we are able to compare their
determinate measures. Without appeals to standards or
measures we are only able to say that one thing is greater
or less than another (earlier or later than another) but
without being able to say what either thing determinately is.
In the Philebus Plato spells out more specifically what
he takes to be the cognitive and practical functions of
immanent standards or measures. They are the objects of
true opinion and of the applied arts and crafts (like account
ing) (Philebus 55d-e, 66bl-2), in the same manner in which
the transcendental measures are the objects of reason and
the purely theoretic sciences (like number theory) (57d2,
58d6-7, 61d-e, 66a-b). False opinion has as its object not
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nothing nor even what is not the case, but rather the phe
nomena which fall away from standards, phenomena, that is,
which are subject to the more and the less and which on
their own are approached only by merely relative measurement.
Such objects tend to cause errors of judgment and practice,
when we have only them before us and so are unable to identify
and assess them with reference to standards (so also Republic
584a, 586b-c). This view of false opinion can be more
easily understood, if it is remembered that opinion is for
Plato at least as much a matter of pragmatics as of semantics.
Opinion is more a matter of determining how we get along in
the world than a determination of propositional accuracy.
Even true opinion is to a large degree a matter of guessing,
forecast and conjecture (Philebus 55e5-56al, 62cl-2). True
opinion is what allows us to succeed at our projects in the
world, by guessing correctly the right course of action
(Republic VI, 506c). Possessing models or blueprints for
identification and guidance is of course very useful in this
state of affairs. We have a better grade of cognition if we
have access to standards and measures than if we do not.
The presence of measures and standards in the phenomenal
realm then benefits that realm by largely constituting its
intelligibility. For it is they which allow us to make accurate
and useful identifications when we have only the phenomenal
realm before us. I suggest that this sort of benefit is the
primary aim of the Demiurge's craftings. The improvements
which he works on the phenomena are primarily epistemological.
VII.

The Scope and Limits of the Demiurge

The interpretation which I have given the Demiurge provides
a sufficient clue in explaining one of his major (though
puzzling) projects. One of the Demiurge's chief creations
(aside from making 'time' and its instruments, the planets)
is his making of the whole universe into a unique living-thing
(30c-31b), an amalgam of the World-Soul and World-Body (34b,
36e) .
We are in a position to give a precise and coherent
rationale for the world's uniqueness. The Demiurge's aim
is to produce an immanent standard of animality. The specific
function which the Demiurge assigns to this immanent standard
is to serve as a model for our own rational cognitive processes.
By using it as a standard and by imitating it, we come to
possess those cognitive faculties, powers, and processes which
result in the possession and articulation of truths (47b6-c4
with 43e-44b and 37b6-8). The Demiurge, in making the WorldLiving-thing a standard, will therefore invest it with whatever
standard-establishing properties he can. Thus it is invested
with the same permanence or everlastingness which the standards
of time possess (36e). If, as I have suggested, uniqueness
is taken by Plato as a standard-establishing property, then
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the Demiurge will invest his immanent standards with this
property, if it is possible to do so. In the case of the
World-living-thing (and possibly only in this case) this
project is possible. And so the world is made unique.
In the case of temporal measures, the Demiurge cannot
introduce uniqueness into the phenomenal realm, given that
(among other things) Plato had to save the appearances with
which that realm actually presents us and that it indeed
presents us with a variety of celestial 'clocks', indeed
at least eight of them (38d, 39b,c). And so in the celestial
realm we are left with a situation rather like a pawnshop in
which there are many watches running both severally (38d4-6)
and collectively at different rates (39c6-7). The same claims
are made of the various temporal paradigms in the Republic,
where their deviations from conditions of constancy are directly
attributed to their corporeality (530b3). And the result (as
we would expect on my reading) is a reduced intelligibility
available for those who try to tell time accurately: the
measures of time are mutually incommensurable (Republic 530a7-b3,
cf. 531al-3) and are bewildering due to their number and
intricacy (Timaeus 39dl-2) .
VIII.

Plato's Sane Craftsman

If the Demiurge's project is, as I have suggested, to
introduce standards into the phenomenal realm by the co-joint
production of accurate images and introduction of standardestablishing properties, then Plato avoids a number of serious
charges which critics have standardly laid against him.
First, Plato and his Demiurge are not conceptually
confused about the nature of the Demiurge's project.
Specifically they have not confused the production of
properties the presence of which in a thing makes it in
herently good with the production of properties that make
a thing an accurate, faithful or correct image of an
original.(12) Rather, Plato and his Demiurge realize that
for an image to serve as an immanent standard it must have
two sorts of properties. On the one hand, to serve as an
immanent standard for the type of things for which it is
to be the standard, a phenomenal image needs to reproduce
accurately the characteristics of its original which make
its original the original it is. The Demiurge will try to
reproduce accurately the proper or internal attributes of
the original in the image which is to serve as a standard.
If we were to pick or produce a painting of Winston Churchill
with the aid of which we were going to proceed to identify
other paintings as being paintings of Winston Churchill, we
would want our standard painting to image as accurately as
possible the distinctive features of Winston Churchill. On

12

the other hand, for an image to be a standard, it will also
need those standard-establishing properties which make it
possible for, and enhance the aptness of, the image to serve
as a standard. These will typically include properties like
orderliness, stability, and unity. Now it is not hard to
understand that these properties might be misconstrued by
critics as being, just in themselves, final constituents of
Platonic goodness. Neo-platonists, critics who have a rightwing political bent or who think Plato has such a bent, and
the aesthetically-minded are all likely to suppose that these
properties of order, stability, and unity just are what it
means to be good for Plato and that the Demiurge needs no
further justification for their introduction into the world.
Thus these critics will claim that if the Demiurge should make
any improvements in the world at all, he will make these
improvements (order, stability, unity). Such a critic is
Cornford, who in speaking of the unique world argument (30c31b) declares:
"Uniqueness is a perfection, and the world
is better for possessing it" (p. 43). From this perspective
of viewing uniqueness, stability and the like as intrinsic
goods or perfections, it will naturally enough appear that
the Demiurge is involved in two wholly unrelated projects:
1) the making of accurate images and 2) the introduction of
properties which count as intrinsic goods. The correct reading,
though, is to view uniqueness, stability and the like as
having instrumental value, as making possible and enhancing
the ability of images to serve as standards. The making of
accurate images and the introducing of standard-establishing
properties are co-joint parts of the Demiurge's project.
Plato's arguments giving the rationales for the Demiurge's
actions, particularly the unique world argument and the account
of the 'eternity' of the world, have been accused of constituting
gross fallacies of division.(13) According to this charge,
the Demiurge allegedly supposes that since the world is (to
be) an instance of a Form, and since this Form is an instance
of uniqueness and eternity, therefore the world is (to be)
unique and eternal for these reasons. However, that some
phenomenal objects are to serve as standards (of a sort)
motivates their coming to possess the standard-establishing
properties of the Ideas, including uniqueness and permanence.
This motivation is quite independent of these phenomenal
objects simply being instances of the Forms of which they
indeed are instances. Therefore, the Demiurge's thought is
not riddled with a fallacy of division.
The Demiurge has also been accused of being quite mad,
since he at least seems to be indiscriminately reproducing in
his copy each and every property of his original. Such an
indiscriminate reproduction of properties would be a crazy
way of proceeding for a number of reasons. First, sometimes
an original will possess properties which are irrelevant to its
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serving as an original (for example, having dents and scratches).
One would not indiscriminately reproduce these in a copy.
Second, there are some properties of an original which, though
relevant to the original serving as an original, are wholly
inappropriate for the product for which the model is used.
Thus it is entirely appropriate that an architect's blueprint
should be made of paper, but one would not make a house of
paper because its plans were made of paper. Third, an original
will possess some properties which are logically impossible
to reproduce in a copy (for example, the age of the original
and the numerical self-identity of the original).
On my reading of the Demiurge he is not subject to these
charges. He does not indiscriminately reproduce the properties
of his model, rather his project of making immanent standards
provides him with a principle for selecting which of the
attributes of his original are to be reproduced. It only
appears that the Demiurge is picking and reproducing properties
indiscriminately because so many of the attributes of the Ideas
are standard-establishing properties and he will try to re
produce all of these. The Demiurge's choices are relevant
and appropriate, guided by the nature of his specific project.
When a relevant property of his model can not(for whatever
reason) be reproduced, the Demiurge will substitute
a related stand-in property to serve in its stead.
The Demiurge is therefore not wanting in intelligence,
ingenuity, or sanity. I suggest that the figure of the Demiurge
is a coherent one. Reasonable attacks upon the Demiurge will
not take the form of accusations of absurdity, but will have
to take the form of trying to show that what Plato wishes to
explain by the figure of the Demiurge, namely, our ability to
make accurate identifications of phenomenal types, can be
achieved with considerably less conspicuous metaphysical
consumption, just as the gods of the cosmological or first
cause arguments are perhaps shown to be otiose by Newtonian
mechanics.
IX.

Theisms

If my reading of the Demiurge's aims and practices is
anywhere near correct, the figure of the Demiurge of the
Timaeus is a singular accomplishment in the history of ideas.
We do not find a figure with his function and nature in either
prior or subsequent theological speculation. The strongest
traditions of theistic speculation in the West have treated
the divine either as primarily a source of motion or as primarily
a source of order. The one tradition can be traced back to
Empedocles, whose Love and Strife set the world's components
in motion. This tradition blossoms in the cosmological and
first cause arguments for the existence of God. The other
tradition can be traced back to Anaxagoras, whose divine Mind
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set the world's components in order. This tradition blossoms
in the teleological arguments for the existence of God.
If my interpretation of Plato's Demiurge is correct,
the Demiurge does not fit into either of these traditions.
For, on the one hand, far from being primarily a source of
motion, the Demiurge is actually a source of stability and
permanence, since these are conditions which enhance the
prospects of some phenomena serving as standard cases. This
is not to deny that the Demiurge might be thought of as
necessarily moving things around: a forge worker will, after
all, move things around in his project of tempering a piece
of steel. But, it does mean that the Demiurge is not hypothesized
to explain the origin or perpetual occurrence of motion in
the universe, as gods are called upon to do in cosmological
arguments, including Plato's own version of those arguments
in the laws X (894e-895b).(14)
Further, on the other hand, though the Demiurge may be
viewed as a source of order, regularity and other 'intrinsic'
goods, neither is their production his final end nor is he
hypothesized in order to explain their presence in the world,
as are hypothesized the gods of teleological arguments. The
nature of the Demiurge is completely compatible with Plato's
claim that there are "traces" of order even in the pre-cosmic
era (53b2).(15) The Demiurge is not responsible for all
regularity and order. He is responsible only for those
final forms of order which proximately serve functions and
manifest purpose. Such final orderings may be entirely new
formations, but they may equally well be, to a large degree,
encorporations of pre-existing orderly elements, which the
Demiurge simply appropriates without alteration from the pre
cosmos (see especially Timaeus 46c-47a). Prior to their
appropriation such elements will not correctly be said to
manifest purpose; afterwards they will. But whether a demiurgic
ordering takes the form of an appropriation or a formation,
it is carried out not as a final end on its own but as part
of the Demiurge's project of making immanent standards.
If the Demiurge bears a resemblance to any of the gods of
the Western theistic traditions, it is to the god of the
ontological argument, or at least, of those variants of the
argument (like that in Descartes's Third Meditation) which
employ the principle of sufficient reason. For both the
Demiurge and the god of this ontological argument are hypothe
sized as necessary beings in consequence of certain epistemo
logical 'phenomena'. Though, even here there is substantial
difference between the two. For the god of the (Cartesian)
ontological argument is hypothesized as being necessary to
explain sufficiently an agent's actual possession of a
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particular concept (e.g*, my actual possession of the idea
of infinity). But the Demiurge is hypothesized, on my ac
count, as being necessary simply for establishing the con
ditions in virtue of which we potentially possess all con
cepts (i.e·, possess the means of forming true opinions
with regard to all phenomenal types).
It is perhaps because theistic speculation in the West
has been so strongly influenced by such a limited number of
traditions that the nature of Plato's Demiurge has remained
largely obscure.(16)
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A divine demiurge also appears in the Laws X (902e-904c).
I have argued elsewhere that the projects and commitments of
the Laws X are incompatible with the cosmology and theology
of the Timaeus. Nothing that is claimed of the Demiurge and
his projects in this paper should be construed as applying to
the Demiurge of the Laws X. See "Plato's Final thoughts on
Evil: Laws X , 900-905," Mind 87 (1978), 572-575; "The Mechanism
of Flux in Plato's Timaeus," Apeiron 14 (1980), 96-114.
2

R.D. Archer-Hind, The Timaeus of Plato (London, 1888),
pp. 37-40; F.M. Cornford, Plato's Cosmology (London, 1937),
pp. 34-39, 76; H.F. Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Plato
and the Academy I (Baltimore, 1944), p. 607, cf. 425; Hans
Herter, "Gott und die Welt bei Platon," BonnJbb 158 (1958),
106-117; Stanley Rosen,"The Myth of the Reversed Cosmos,"
Rev. Metaphysics 33 (1979), 75-76. For refreshing exceptions
to this non-literalist trend,see T.M. Robinson, Plato1s
Psychology (Toronto, 1970), pp. 59-92 and A.E. Taylor, A
Commentary on Plato's Timaeus (Oxford, 1928), pp. 63-67.
Taylor, though, does not think that the Timaeus expresses
Plato's own views.
3
For arguments favoring a non-literal reading ,see Cherniss,
pp. 421-431, and for a defense of Cherniss' views,see Leonardo
Taran, "The Creation Myth in Plato's Timaeus" in Essays in
Ancient Greek Philosophy, J.P. Anton and G.L. Kustas (eds.),
(Albany, 1971), pp. 372-407. For an attack on Cherniss' views,
see Gregory Vlastos, "Creation in the Timaeus: Is it a Fiction?"
in Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, R.E. Allen (ed.) , (London,
1965) pp. 409-419; see also Robinson, pp. 58-68.
4
For some discussion of these sorts of status questions ,
see J.B. Skemp, The Theory of Motion in Plato's Later Dialogues
(Amsterdam, 1967), pp. 163-170 and
"The Relation of Reason
to Soul in the Platonic Cosmology," Apeiron 16 (1982), 21-26.
5
For an early dating with this aim m mind ,see G.E.L. Owen,
"The Place of the Timaeus in Plato's Dialogues" in Studies in
Plato's Metaphysics, pp. 313-338.
6

In the late dialogues "measure" (μέτρον = "limit," πέρας,
Philebus 52c) tends to replace "paradigm" ( παράδειγμα )
as Plato's term of choice for the notion 'examplar'. Plato
in the late dialogues begins to use παράδειγμα
(when used
as a quasi-technical expression) to mean "parallel case" or
"analogue" (Statesman 278e).
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I suggest that Plato draws in a general way the
distinction between perfect instances and degenerate
instances of a standard or model in the Sophist (235b-236c)
where he distinguishes between two kinds of imitation
( μίμησυς,
235dl). There is imitation which produces
images ( είκούς )· These reproduce the exact proportions
of their originals ( παραδείγματα ). And there is
imitation which produces phantasms ( φαντάσματα ).
These, though somewhat similar to the content of their
originals, deviate from corresponding precisely to them.
It also seems that the "immanent characters" of the
Phaedo (103b,e) are perfect particulars of the Forms of
which they are instances. See Alexander Nehamas, "Plato
on the Imperfection of the Sensible World," APQ, 12 (1975),
105-117, for a general defense of the presence of perfect
particulars of Forms in the middle dialogues. For the
immanent characters of the Phaedo, see esp. page 116.

g

Robinson suggests that the presence here of generated
models is a "patent fiction," that they are hypothesized as
existing solely for the sake of argument (p.67). This would
be a possible interpretation if this were the only text where
generated paradigms were advanced by Plato.
9
On this passage see W. K. C. Guthrie's excellent comments,
A History of Greek Philosophy V (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1978), pp. 299-301.
■*"^For a discussion of the role of models in the production
of Greek sculpture, see Carl Blumel, Greek Sculptors at Work
(Glasgow, 1969) second English edition, pp. 36-39. Note
illustration 28, in which the divine craftsman Athena is
represented as making a clay model which a marble sculptor
will then use.
■^In the Philebus the paronymous forms of μέτρον, viz.,
έμμετρον and σύμμετρον , generally refer to immanent rather
than transcendent measures or standards (26a7,8; 52c4; 64d9;
65dl0). The issue of the status of measures in the Philebus
is much debated. For defenses that some measures in the
Philebus are Platonic Forms, see "The Platonic Number Theory
in Republic VII and Philebus," Isis 72 (1981), 620-627
and "Philebus 55c-62a and Revisionism" forthcoming in CJP,
suppl. vol. IX, New Essays on Plato (1983).
12

This charge of conceptual confusion is laid by Richard
Patterson, "The Unique World Argument of the Timaeus,"
Phoenix 35 (1981), 116-119.
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This charge and the next are laid by David Keyt,
"The Mad Craftsman of the Timaeus," PhilRev 80 (1971),
230-235.
14

For an analysis of Plato's version of the cosmological
argument, see "The Sources of Evil Problem and the Principle
of Motion Doctrine in Plato," Apeiron 14 (1980), 45-46.
15Vlastos thinks that Plato's commitment to some
orderly elements in the pre-cosmos is fundamentally incoherent
when placed against a metaphysical background which includes
a demiurgic god ("The Disorderly Motion in the Timaeus"
in Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, pp. 389-390; also "Creation
in the Timaeus," pp. 413-414).
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Some of the positions taken in this paper are defended
and developed in more detail in the first two chapters of
The Platonic Cosmology (Leiden, E.J. Brill) forthcoming.

